Moral Health

At 15h00 today, the headlines of the on-line edition of the French newspaper Le Monde reads: Le Président iranien déclare qu’ “Israël doit être rayé de la carte”. That is, to say, “Israel must be taken off the map”. See the remaks in red at the end of this entry

I quickly went to the on-line edition of the New York Times in order to see what the headlines there might be.  Well, as of this writing, not a word is mentioned by the New York Times about the declaration of Iran’s President.  The newspaper does mention that 2000 Americans have lost their lives in the war in Iraq.  It is, of course, appropriate that this should be mention.

Still, I am a loss as to how the newspaper which prints all the news that is fit to be printed has not seen fit to have a headline story regarding the declaration of the Iranian president that Israel should be taken off the map. Le Monde goes so far as to say that the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has called for unity among Palestinians in order to attain the annihilation of the Zionist regime.  Indeed, the Le Monde tells us that France and Germany, along with the United States, has condemned the remarks of the Iranian president.  Still, not a word about this appears in the New York Times.

What might explain the silence of New York Times here?  For I would have thought that (a) whether one is for or against President Bush or (b) whether or not one is for or against the war in Iraq, the brazen declaration by the Iranian president deserve to be headline news.

Now, you see it has seemed to many that France is not exactly a friend of Israel.  And the newspaper Le Monde is not known for its pro-Israel stance.  Thus, one might have thought that if, indeed, Le Monde could manage to make the remarks of President Ahmadinejad one of its leading stories, then surely the New York Times could have manage to do so.

I think that President Bush has many drawbacks.  However, I think that he is unequivocally right about one thing, namely the threat of evil by terrorists.  Not only that, I think that the left, with its blind determination to deny the reality of the threat of terrorism, has become an ally of the evil of terrorism.  What is more, I think that a like claim can be made for the European Union.

If history reveals to us anything at all, it reveals that we should not, and must not, appease evil.  Why?  Because evil cannot be appeased.  And the reason why evil cannot be appeased is that what it is committed to is nothing other than a brazen lie.  More evil has been attributed to Jews generally, and to the State of Israel, in particular, than Jews could possibly have committed.  Quite simply, there are not enough Jews in the world.  The Nation of Islam has accused Jews of masterminding the American slave trade.  Never mind that history shows that it was Muslim Arabs who were trafficking in black slavery on the continent of Africa prior to the American slave trade.  Muslim Arabs have accused Jews of drinking the blood of non-Jewish children.  Again, it is utterly irrelevant to the lie that blood is the very last thing that any self-identified Jew would consume (since Judaism is relentless in its insistence that blood not contaminate food products).

It is now 16h00, and still there is no headline story in the on-line edition of the New York Times regarding the vile words of the president of Iran concerning Israel.

France, Germany, and the United States: all speaking with one voice.  That ought to be newsworthy in and of itself.

But politics in America is such that we have become so consumed with bitterness and destroying the other that we cannot see that, by our own divisiveness, we are setting ourselves up to be destroyed.

One might have thought that for just a moment both Democrats and Republicans could put aside their difference to present a unified front against the viciousness of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—a man who is calling for the complete elimination of the State of Israel.

Now, this is why I think that terrorism will eventually win both here and abroad.  Bitterness is the handmaiden of evil; for it is in the nature of bitterness that those who are bitter will destroy the good that they have in order to get back at the other.  And there is nothing that the terrorist would like more than to Americans so consumed by bitterness that they will not allow themselves to see the increasing grip of terrorism.

Alas, the terrorists are getting what they want, as the difference between the on-line headlines of the New York Times and the Le Mondemakes painfully clear.

Addendum #1: 21h25

The New York Times has since published an article on the subject.  But here is the difference.  I went to Le Monde, and the article that I referenced was the lead article that came up when I brought up the on-line edition.  With the NYT, one has to look at the international section.  I would have thought the story important enough to merit being a lead story when one brings up the on-line edition of the newspaper.  The call for the elimination of an entire state ought to be front-page news.  So I am still left wondering what took the paper so long, and why this threat from the president of Iran does not merit to be a lead story that comes up when the paper is brought on-line.  The decision to place the story in the background is revealing.  Le Monde has also noted that the international community has condemened the statements by the president of Iran.  The NYT is not yet carrying that story.  Here we have about as much unity as we have seen in a long time in ths world; and the NYT does not seem to think that this merits a “front-page” on-line headline.  Of course not, this would make Bush seem credible about something; namely terrorism; and we can’t have that.

In is article on the international condemnation of proposal by the president of Iran, Le Monde states the obvious, namely that the stance of this man is a “Cauchemar [nightmare] pour la communauté internationale”.  I would have thought that the New York Times and Le Monde should be speaking with one voice.

Addendum #2 – 27 October

I do not, of course, hold the silly view that something is important merely because it appears in the Le Monde.  But if France, a country that has been very sympathetic to Arabic states, is alarmed by the radicalisation that is taking place in Iran, then what is taking place in Iran is indeed cause for alarm.  For usually, the attitude of France is that the United States is over-reacting to Arabic sentiments.  It is an extremely dangerous sign that the leaders of a nation could be so busy posturing for power and attacking one another that such venomous words by a head of state should go relatively unnoticed.  This is especially so in view of the fact that this marks a sharp departure from the approach of the previous head of state–a virtual about face, in fact.

Craliger is a reformed rapist, who knows that he cannot possibly undo the horrendous wrong that he did to the 18 year-old, call her Nataminine, whom he raped some ten years ago.  He is not pretending that such a thing is even possible.  Still, he is not the man that he once was.  Craliger set up a foundation, called MARV (Men Against Rape Violence), the aim of which is to educate men regarding their sexist attitudes towards women by drawing attention to the profound ways in which the violence of rape is tied to the vulnerability men; and it is he who opens each meeting with a most poignant account of his past and transformation.  This Craliger has been doing for 10 years.  It goes without saying that Craliger talks about the wrong that he did without mentioning Nataminine’s name.

Now Nataminine, who is still wrestling with her pain owing to have been raped by Craliger, learns about MARV and the role of Craliger in it. She can show up at a MARV convention and mightily denounce Craliger.  She can, as it were, put flesh and bones upon the account that he tells of his life and the wrong of rape that he committed.  Yet, she knows there is nothing that she would say that would add in content to Craliger’s account; for she learns that in no way does his account of matters diminish the wrong that he committed.  Quite the contrary, his account is eye-opening even to her, as he proffers details that indeed reveal just how vicious a man that he was.  She could go on being bitter at him because nothing he does will change the fact that he raped her and damaged her considerably.  As it happens, she is being given all the psychological help that she needs and financially she is as well-off as a person could be.  So it is not as if there is anything that Craliger could do to make a difference—though it goes without saying that if he could, then Craliger would.  No doubt I should mention that he had sent her a profound letter of contrition years before he had started MARV.  Understandably, perhaps, Nataminine threw away the letter away in disgust and outrage.

Do I think that Craliger is morally entitled to forgiveness from Nataminine?  Absolutely not.  On the other hand, I think that her forgiving him would be a most majestic instance of forgiveness as righteousness.  There are various possibilities here.  One is that she lacks the psychological wherewithal to forgive him, because she remains too scared.  Another is that she simply wants to hold a grudge against him.  It should be pointed out here that even if there is nothing whatsoever that Craliger could possibly do that would diminish the wrong that he did, it does not follow from this truth that it does not matter at all how he went on to live.  He could, for instance, deny the wrong that he did.  Even worse, he could claim that she deserved to be so wronged; and in keeping with that, he could go around boasting of what he did.  That would be objectionable in and of itself.  So whatever it is that one thinks of Craliger and MARV, it is absolutely not morally insignificant that this is the route that he took.  Besides, we may not use the wrongs that have been done to us as an excuse to distort or diminish the moral good that another does.  Thus, not even Nataminine’s moral pain allows her to claim that what Craliger is doing is insignificant.

Of course, it does not follow from anything that has just been said that Nataminine is under an obligation to forgive Craliger.  Still, it turns out that there some significant moral constraints that apply to her; for she may not use her moral pain as an excuse to diminish the good that he is doing.  Nonetheless, there is a difference between, on the one hand, not diminishing the good that another is doing and, on the other, affirming it.  In order not to diminish the good that Craliger is doing, Nataminine need only to keep her mouth shut.  When his name comes up she listens quietly or discreetly leaves the room.  And if this is all that she ever does, then it follows that she is not in any way diminishing the good that he is doing.  Yet, there is a tremendous good that she can do: She can affirm the good that he is doing by forgiving him. This would be a righteous act.  It would be an affirmation of his transformation that would be quite unlike the affirmation that could come from any other person, as it would be an acknowledgement that she, whose trust he so brutally breached, found him trustworthy again.  No other person on the face of the earth is in the position to offer this depth of affirmation.  None of the men whose lives he touches; none of the women who are grateful for the transformation on his part that enables him to touch the lives of men in this way.  And if she were to forgive him publicly that would be all the more dramatic.  For her life would bear witness to the possibility that trust again is possible; and that would undoubtedly serve to liberate many a woman suffering from the damage of rape.

Still, what we would have in this case is not any form of restoration. Craliger has not repaired anything.  However, Nataminine has looked beyond that to the enormous good that he is doing.  And she has found the strength to affirm that.  I take the majesty of what she has done to be self-evident.  The forgiveness that gives rise to the affirmation stems not from servility on Nataminine’s part or a refusal to acknowledge the depth of the wrong that Craliger did.  There is no self-denial at play.  Nonetheless, her forgiveness did require considerable moral fortitude.  It required the wherewithal to look beyond her own pain and acknowledge that Craliger was doing a considerable good and he was doing so with earnestness and purity of heart.  Yet, her forgiveness of him, in constituting an affirmation of him that none other can give, stands as a moral power of the highest magnitude that she thereby exercises.

Some concluding remarks are in order.  The first is the unfortunate truth that few people own up to the horrendous wrongs that they have done in the way that Craliger is portrayed as having done.  All the same, forgiveness as righteousness requires this high level of moral excellence.  Even on the view that forgiveness as righteousness is a gift, there is still the truth that a person can fail to merit a gift.  No matter how much a person might want a Steinway piano, it would not be appropriate to give a person one as a gift if the individual has not a clue as to how to play the piano.  This would be true regardless of how much money the would-be-gift giver should have at her or his disposal.

I have talked about forgiveness with regard to a very personal violation.  But I have done so with some very profound social harms in mind, such as Apartheid and the Holocaust.  It has become commonplace these days to define ethnic pride or self-respect in such a way that having these goods is incompatible with forgiving.  Indeed, the willingness to forgive is all but characterized as a moral flaw.  Undoubtedly, a person can be a little too willing to forgive, but we do not have a case of that here.

My assumption is as follows: If forgiveness as righteousness on Nataminine’s part is plausible in the case of Craliger—as surely it is, then it is manifestly false that forgiveness as righteousness with respect to racial injustice portends a lack of either self-respect or ethnic pride.  I do not believe in comparing evils.  But I cannot think of a more indicative of moral depravity than the following: “I would take brutal rape any day over racism”.

In any event, the point is this.  It is not possible to hold that a self-respecting Nataminine can forgive a Craliger, but insist that a self-respecting black cannot forgive a white for racism or a self-respecting Jew cannot forgive a Nazi for anti-Semitism or a self-respecting Irishman cannot forgive English Protestants for religious persecution, where in each of these cases the offender has gone on to do tremendous good publicly using his sordid past as a moral catalyst.  For just as Nataminine may not use her moral pain as an excuse to distort the good that Craliger is doing, it holds in general that people may not the use wrongs that they have suffered as an excuse to distort or diminish the good of others, including those who were once utterly lacking in virtue.  Whatever self-respect or ethnic pride may come to: either is but an illusion of inner-strength if either serves as an excuse for diminishing the good that others do.

Finally, the very nature of righteousness at its best is that it accomplishes what it does while far exceeding all plausible moral demands that can be made.  In a city of angels, there would be none but the righteousness.  Accordingly, trust would be a part of the very fabric of everyone’s life.  Presumably, everyone would be constituted so as to be trustworthy.  Or, in any case, being trustworthy would so very much a part of everyone’s character that it would be second nature to all.  There would be no violations of trust with which anyone would have to contend.  There would be no scars owing to having been caught off-guard.  However, in the less than idyllic setting of reality, trust violated is an ever-present concern.  What is more, few who violate the trust of another ever come even remotely close to earning again.  But if such a person should have the fortitude to do so, then the simple truth of the matter is that there is no affirmation quite like the acknowledgement, from the one whom he had wronged, to the effect that he is again trustworthy.  To be in the position to offer or withhold such enormous affirmation is have considerable power with respect to a person’s life.  And just as nothing will ever detract from the suffering that anyone had endured, it is also true that suffering that a person has endured will not change the reality that the person wronged is now in the position either to offer or to withhold affirmation that a person who had once been untrustworthy has proven himself trustworthy again.

In any given context, the worse thing is not to possess the power to make a difference for the better.  The next worse thing is having that power and not being willing to use it.  And precisely what distinguishes the righteous person from the ordinary person is that the former never allows his pain alone to be an excuse not to do what is good.  Far from being a sign of weakness, forgiveness as righteousness bespeaks a fortitude of character exceeded only by the gods—if, that is, there should be any.

G u e s t  A u t h o r

Nick Wright

“I’m not American; I’m Black”

My good friend and roommate made this claim the other night while we were watching something about American politics abroad.  I found that to be a very interesting distinction that I’m sure some Blacks agree with and some that certainly do not.  However, the point is not whether or not his sentiment is echoed by others.  The point is that he was drawing the line between two racial or ethnic identities.  I do not necessarily have a problem with that.  I have many Hispanic friends who consider themselves Hispanics but also consider themselves Black in a way because to them “Black” means people of color, any color.  Once again, I am not making a moral evaluation of those determinations, I am simply stating that I have heard multiple times people draw a line as to what race or ethnicity they believe they fall in to.  I truly have no problem with any of this.  However, what I do have a problem with is the following.  I have no tolerance for, let alone patience for, people who feel like they are X first and a human being second (X being some racial group).

To me, it is wholly unacceptable to feel a stronger tie to your individual race or group than you do to humanity as a whole.  It is because of this type of people and this thought pattern that so many injustices and horrors go on in our world.  Whether it be the Sudan today, or Rwanda of yesterday or hate crimes in the United States of yesterday, today and, to be sure, tomorrow, all of these problems were precipitated on the belief that people owe a loyalty to their own ethnic group that they do not owe to humanity as a whole, and that is morally repugnant.

Now, I am certainly not saying one should not have ethnic pride or even that one can’t enjoy seeing people of his ethnicity succeed more than he would enjoy seeing others succeed.  I also have no problem with the idea of identifying strongly with your heritage and ancestry and trying to teach your children the pride that goes along with that.  But, that simply does not excuse teaching your children or believing yourself that your first loyalty in the world is to “your” people, rather than simply to “people”.

Racial and ethnic pride can be a majestic force.  It can bring together downtrodden and struggling communities unlike almost anything else.  However, it also has the power to destroy everyone in its path when people stop losing site of the face that while there are Black people and White people and Yellow people and Brown people and the one thing all of them have in common is that they are all just that–people.

Let me begin with a statement that surely is not politically correct.  As tthe three monotheistic religions are generally practiced, Islam is most out of step with the idea of equality of women as we now conceive of things in Western societies.  Certainly, Christianity is accepting of women being major players in society-at-large.  However, even Orthodox Judaism, which sharply limits the role that women have in religious service, is quite compatible with—perhaps even encouraging of—woman being major players in society-at-large.  With Christianity and Judaism, only fringe groups seems to think women should not be major players in society-at-large.

Islam, however, is another matter entirely.  The idea that women should not be major players in society-at-large is common enough among Muslims generally.  And in Muslim circles, one can without too much difficulty find those who think that a woman should be subordinate to men, where the subordination does not call to mind chivalry at all.  In Paris, I often watched entirely covered Muslim women (that is women wearing the burqua) lower their eyes to keep from glancing at males dressed in a lascivious manner.  Yet, I have noticed that Muslim men do not behave in a like manner.  And the observation here has been with regard to Muslim couples.  One could agree that the requirements of modesty are more stringent for women without thinking that these requirements do not apply to men at all.  It seems to me that if a married women should not gaze at lasciviously dressed men, then in a like manner married men should not gaze at lasciviously dressed women.

This brings me to Ontario, Canada.  In the 90s, Ontario tried something rather novel, namely allowing religious traditions to serve as a court of arbitration for those who agreed to it.  So, for instance, three rabbis (rather than a Canadian court) might be used to settle a dispute between a Jewish storeowner and a Jewish offender, should the owner and the offender agree to it.  (more…)