Moral Health

We are quintessentially social creatures.  The sense of self that we have is not a matter of some immutable stuff that operates regardless of the circumstances of our social surroundings.  Quite the contrary, it turns out with rare exception that the sense of self that we have is ineluctably tied to our social surroundings.  Another of way of putting the preceding remarks is that there is no robust sense of “I” that unfolds regardless of the social circumstances in which we find ourselves.

No doubt there are exceptions here.  But the exceptions prove the rule.  If we look at history, we can see that most blacks during American slavery did not turn out to be a Frederick Douglass and that most women born in 1867 did not turn out to be a Marie Curie and that most Jews in the Holocaust did not turn out to be an Elie Wiesel.

Now, the social circumstances in which we find ourselves define the expectations of excellence that we have of ourselves; and any adequate account of the expectations of excellence that we have of ourselves also makes references to what counts as acceptable and unacceptable excuses for our inappropriate behavior.  There is an inverse relation between a robust self and acceptable excuses or the absence of excellent behavior: the more robust the self the fewer the acceptable excuses.

Needless to say, it is possible for the self to be robust along one dimension of excellence but not another.  So, a person could have a very robust self with respect to moral excellence but not intellectual excellence or conversely.  There are numerous instances where religious groups seem to satisfy the condition of having an extremely robust self in terms of moral excellence while setting intellectual excellence aside.  In so doing, they speak to the quite significant view that character is more fundamental than intellect.  Surely, there is something right about that.

Now, it is said the mark of any theory is its explanatory power.  I believe that the view that I have advanced has considerable explanatory power, as I shall now try to show.

It is no mystery that on any number fronts, society has become far more harsh than it used to be.  To take two obvious vectors: people are far less polite and considerate and respectful.

Everyone is in a hurry.  But it is not just that everyone is in a hurry; it is that everyone seems to think that her being in a hurry or his being in a hurry justifies crass indifference towards others.  Road rage is an example par excellence of this.  But it gets worse: road rage has been called a psychological disorder.  This is effectively to say that people cannot be held accountable for their road rage behavior.  People do not drive too fast.  Oh no, perish the thought.

People suffer from a psychological condition that impairs their ability to grasp that the speed with which they are driving is so great that they are thereby endangering the lives of other drivers.  And this impairment is no doubt owing to the inability of individuals to properly perceive the connection between the weight of their foot upon the gas peddle and the speed with which the car accelerates.

How could anyone be expected to grasp all of that?

A mere 30 years ago, it would have seemed downright absurd to just about anyone that “impolite driving” had anything to do with a condition from which people suffered.  In those days, people had a very simple name for speeding, namely: irresponsible behavior.  The significant point here is that calling road rage a condition constitutes turning irresponsible behavior into something that is excusable and engendering a set of expectations on the part of the members of society according to which it is unreasonable to expect people to exercise this level of control over their behavior.

Notice here that in chipping away at the robust self here we are systematically legitimating excuses.

As I have intimated on numerous occasions in various of my blog-entries, it is striking that blacks in the 50s and 60s made far more progress towards racial equality than contemporary blacks have made although on every conceivable account blacks in the 50s and 60s had far less than contemporary blacks have.

But the difference is this: Blacks in the 50s and 60s had a far more robust moral self than do contemporary blacks today.  Indeed, if anything is true, it is true that the moral self of society in general has become considerably less robust.

Just so, the black experience here offers a more profound insight than one might suppose.  For if I am right, then that experience shows that mere oppression is not necessarily incompatible with having a robust sense of moral self.  Or, to put the point the other way, it does not follow from the absence of oppression that a people thereby have a moral robust sense of moral self.  Indeed, I have already indicated that it is not just that blacks who have a less robust sense of moral self, this claim can be made of society-at-large.

It is not insignificant that this less robust sense of moral self in society seems to coincide with the decline of religion.  And here, too, the black experience is rather illuminating; for in the midst of racist oppression, religion played a most salubrious role in the lives of blacks, occasioning a most robust sense of moral self on the part of many blacks.

Drawing upon Freud, societal expectations give rise to internalized values.  What our parents expect of us invariably forms our values.  The expectations of society inform the attitudes of our parents.  To be sure, there is not a perfect fit here.  Rather, there is a considerable measure of congruence.  And we have to make adjustment for communities.  Some communities, such as the Amish, tend to be rather closed; and I have already mentioned, religious communities often provide a considerable measure of protection from “outside” influences.

At any event, the point is that it is very rare for persons to leap frog over the expectations of their parents and their community and their society.  So when we have a considerable congruence between these three with regard to moral and intellectual excellences, the only thing that we can reasonably expect is that the internalized values of folks will mirror the corresponding expectations of this triad.

If moral and intellectual excellences are downplayed because there is always a “good excuse” not to excel in these ways, then guess what, people will find always find a “good excuse” not to excel with regard to these matters.  That is, as the self is less robust with regard to these matters, then moral and intellectual excellences will wane.

Equality can be morally and intellectually bankrupt.  And it seems to me that modern democracy has given rise to precisely that.  Freedom shorn of moral and intellectual excellence is not virtuous; and calling such freedom democracy does not make it so.

We are quintessentially social creatures.  The sense of self that we have is not a matter of some immutable stuff that operates regardless of the circumstances of our social surroundings.  Quite the contrary, it turns out with rare exception that the sense of self that we have is ineluctably tied to our social surroundings.  Another of way of putting the preceding remarks is that there is no robust sense of “I” that unfolds regardless of the social circumstances in which we find ourselves.

No doubt there are exceptions here.  But the exceptions prove the rule.  If we look at history, we can see that most blacks during American slavery did not turn out to be a Frederick Douglass and that most women born in 1867 did not turn out to be a Marie Curie and that most Jews in the Holocaust did not turn out to be an Elie Wiesel.

Now, the social circumstances in which we find ourselves define the expectations of excellence that we have of ourselves; and any adequate account of the expectations of excellence that we have of ourselves also makes references to what counts as acceptable and unacceptable excuses for our inappropriate behavior.  There is an inverse relation between a robust self and acceptable excuses or the absence of excellent behavior: the more robust the self the fewer the acceptable excuses.

Needless to say, it is possible for the self to be robust along one dimension of excellence but not another.  So, a person could have a very robust self with respect to moral excellence but not intellectual excellence or conversely.  There are numerous instances where religious groups seem to satisfy the condition of having an extremely robust self in terms of moral excellence while setting intellectual excellence aside.  In so doing, they speak to the quite significant view that character is more fundamental than intellect.  Surely, there is something right about that.

Now, it is said the mark of any theory is its explanatory power.  I believe that the view that I have advanced has considerable explanatory power, as I shall now try to show.

It is no mystery that on any number fronts, society has become far more harsh than it used to be.  To take two obvious vectors: people are far less polite and considerate and respectful.

Everyone is in a hurry.  But it is not just that everyone is in a hurry; it is that everyone seems to think that her being in a hurry or his being in a hurry justifies crass indifference towards others.  Road rage is an example par excellence of this.  But it gets worse: road rage has been called a psychological disorder.  This is effectively to say that people cannot be held accountable for their road rage behavior.  People do not drive too fast.  Oh no, perish the thought.

People suffer from a psychological condition that impairs their ability to grasp that the speed with which they are driving is so great that they are thereby endangering the lives of other drivers.  And this impairment is no doubt owing to the inability of individuals to properly perceive the connection between the weight of their foot upon the gas peddle and the speed with which the car accelerates.

How could anyone be expected to grasp all of that?

A mere 30 years ago, it would have seemed downright absurd to just about anyone that “impolite driving” had anything to do with a condition from which people suffered.  In those days, people had a very simple name for speeding, namely: irresponsible behavior.  The significant point here is that calling road rage a condition constitutes turning irresponsible behavior into something that is excusable and engendering a set of expectations on the part of the members of society according to which it is unreasonable to expect people to exercise this level of control over their behavior.

Notice here that in chipping away at the robust self here we are systematically legitimating excuses.

As I have intimated on numerous occasions in various of my blog-entries, it is striking that blacks in the 50s and 60s made far more progress towards racial equality than contemporary blacks have made although on every conceivable account blacks in the 50s and 60s had far less than contemporary blacks have.

But the difference is this: Blacks in the 50s and 60s had a far more robust moral self than do contemporary blacks today.  Indeed, if anything is true, it is true that the moral self of society in general has become considerably less robust.

Just so, the black experience here offers a more profound insight than one might suppose.  For if I am right, then that experience shows that mere oppression is not necessarily incompatible with having a robust sense of moral self.  Or, to put the point the other way, it does not follow from the absence of oppression that a people thereby have a moral robust sense of moral self.  Indeed, I have already indicated that it is not just that blacks who have a less robust sense of moral self, this claim can be made of society-at-large.

It is not insignificant that this less robust sense of moral self in society seems to coincide with the decline of religion.  And here, too, the black experience is rather illuminating; for in the midst of racist oppression, religion played a most salubrious role in the lives of blacks, occasioning a most robust sense of moral self on the part of many blacks.

Drawing upon Freud, societal expectations give rise to internalized values.  What our parents expect of us invariably forms our values.  The expectations of society inform the attitudes of our parents.  To be sure, there is not a perfect fit here.  Rather, there is a considerable measure of congruence.  And we have to make adjustment for communities.  Some communities, such as the Amish, tend to be rather closed; and I have already mentioned, religious communities often provide a considerable measure of protection from “outside” influences.

At any event, the point is that it is very rare for persons to leap frog over the expectations of their parents and their community and their society.  So when we have a considerable congruence between these three with regard to moral and intellectual excellences, the only thing that we can reasonably expect is that the internalized values of folks will mirror the corresponding expectations of this triad.

If moral and intellectual excellences are downplayed because there is always a “good excuse” not to excel in these ways, then guess what, people will find always find a “good excuse” not to excel with regard to these matters.  That is, as the self is less robust with regard to these matters, then moral and intellectual excellences will wane.

Equality can be morally and intellectually bankrupt.  And it seems to me that modern democracy has given rise to precisely that.  Freedom shorn of moral and intellectual excellence is not virtuous; and calling such freedom democracy does not make it so.