Moral Health

If anything is true, it is true that with a child just about anything can go wrong in the blink of an eye.  Children dart about here and there, exploring this and that.  Unlike adults, children have almost no genuine sense of anticipated danger.  Children live in the present.  So with even the best of parents, a child is apt to suffer a misfortune that in no way whatsoever reflects upon the parents as inadequate parents.

But I have tried, with no success whatsoever, to imagine just how it is that a parent could get out of a car that she or he was driving and forget that her or his infant had been left in the car unattended, where the child is forgotten about for so long that the child dies or suffers considerable damage.  I can understand a momentary distraction of several minutes even.  But I cannot fathom being so distracted that I get out of the car and hours pass before I realize that I did not have my child with me.  It is reported that Kevin Kelly did just that, because he was much distracted.  As a result, his daughter Frances Kelly died from the oppressive heat.

Naturally, there is a respect in which has a great deal of compassion or pity for Kelly.  After all, he has suffered a terrible lost.  And certainly traditional punishment seems misguided in that there is no straightforward sense in which it can be said that he intended the harm of his daughter.

However, there is a famous line by the late philosopher Bernard Williams that seems quite applicable here, although the context is somewhat different, namely: One thought too many.  In a word, the move is that if a person reflections need to pass by way of Kant’s moral theory in order for the person to be motivated to save his spouse, then that is one thought too many.

In a like manner, then, if a person is so distracted that he can go for hours without remembering that he left his child unattended in the car, then that person one thought too many.  As a spouse or even a dear friend, there is something terribly unfit about me as a person if my reflections need to pass through Kant’s moral theory in order for me to be motivated to save my spouse or dear friend.  So much so that while a person would understandably be happy that she was rescued, she would nonetheless be miffed—and rightly so—over the reasoning that occasioned the rescue.

Significantly, a single instance of inappropriate motives can suffice to raise grave concern regarding a person’s moral fitness.

My thought, then, is really a very simple one.  People who could be so distracted that they could forgot for hours that they had left their child in a car unattended are not fit to be parents.  Let me explain.

To begin with, there is the straightforward fact that it strikes as impossible to drive with a child in a car and not be continually conscious of that reality.  I am in general a decent driver, but whenever I drive with a child in a car there is a level of concern that I have that I would not have otherwise.  Just as it is a given that I do not want to harm myself, it is also a given that I do not want to be the moral cause of the harm that a child suffers.  Short of being possessed, it is not conceivable to me that I could forget that I am driving with a child in the car (given that this is indeed the case).  Accordingly, it is not possible that I could arrive at my destination and lose sight of the reality that I had driven with a child in the car.  So, the very idea of forgetting for hours that I had left a child unattended in a car is simply incomprehensible to me.  Not even an event like 9/11 could cause that to happen, precisely because in that case there would be absolutely nothing more important to me than protecting the child.

Of course, I am not a parent.  But I have the pleasure of knowing some wonderful parents with young children: The Simon and Leslie Saks Family and the Laurent and Céphora Rougemont Family.  Not even all the prophets of the three monotheistic religions—Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed—shouting in unison could get these parents to forget for hours that they had left their children unattended.

Part of what constitutes being a good parent is that there are certain sensibilities that are always in place.  These sensibilities do not get overridden or pushed aside owing to the stress of the moment.  Indeed, if that is all it takes, namely great stress, in order for the appropriate sensibilities to be pushed into the background, causing one’s child to be in harm’s way, then precisely what follows is that one is not fit to be a parent.

In the case of Kevin Kelly, I remarked earlier that we may naturally have some passion or pity for him, because he has obvious suffere4d a loss.  Just so, we should not hesitate to draw the quite appropriate conclusion ineluctably warranted by his own behavior, namely that he was unfit to be a parent.  His loss should not blind us to this reality.  And insofar as it does, then appropriate compassion turns into misplaced compassion.  For you see, he is the reason for why he suffered the loss.  It is not that the sky suddenly opened up and a giant bird descended and swooped up his child and then consumed the baby.  Nor, more prctically speaking, is the loss of the child owing to, for example, Kelly’s car being hit by an inebriated driver.

No, the problem is that Kelly was so distracted that hours went by without him remembering that he had left his infant child in the car unattended.  And that entails a fundamental defect in his character at least when it comes to parenting—a form of depravity, if you will, at least with regard to parenting.

Am I being too harsh here?  I think not.  As a single individual without children, I can choose to stay out all night and dance, whenever it pleases me to do so.  But if I decide to take care of your children for the weekend, then choosing to go out and dance all night, while the children are sleeping in my home, reveals a level of moral depravity on my part.

As I noted earlier, a single instance of behavior can in some instance reveal a deep, deep depravity.  An adult does not need to touch a child sexually three or more times in order for us to be warranted in drawing the conclusion that she or he is morally depraved in a certain respect.  No, a single instance of such behavior suffices.

Surely, then, the point cannot be that when it comes to forgetting for hours that one has left a infant in a car unattended, we need several instances of such behavior before we are warranted in drawing the conclusion that we have a lack of sensibility here that bespeaks a depravity.  Kevin Kelly’s own loss must not blind us to his moral depravity.  Indeed, it is his depravity that occasioned the loss.  Nothing else did.  And we must not lose sight of this moral reality.

Let me see: How many times may a sexually starved professor make sexual advances towards a college student before we contend that that the professor’s behavior is entirely unacceptable?  Do I hear: One time more than suffices?  Well, if we think that protecting a college student from sexual advances is more important than protecting an infant from death, then Kevin Kelly’s behavior and the concomitant commitment to being so understanding of his pain may reveal a greater moral problem, namely a morally depraved society.

Imagine a world in which, from the standpoint of adults, the differences between pets and children had for all practical purposes had disappeared.  Presumably, some differences would prevail.  Human beings cannot, for instance, give birth to dogs or cats or rabbits or what have you; whereas human beings can give birth to human infants.  And one imagines that, even in a world where having test-tube babies is a complete option, parents of children will generally prefer giving birth to their children.

What I am asking you to imagine, however, is a world in which from the standpoint of the child, there is not much difference between the way the child is treated by his parents and the way in which the parents treat the pet of the home—a dog, say.  The child is well-fed; the pet is well-fed.  Indeed, just as the parents would not dream of simply giving the child scraps off the table, they would not dream of giving scraps off the table to the dog.  Quite the contrary, they buy nothing but the best for the dog. (more…)

If I were writing a novel, and a section was about parents who so addicted to video games that they seriously neglected their children, most people would probably think that is way too silly of an idea for anyone to take it seriously.  Such a premise might make for bad science fiction, but it would be very much in keeping with reality.  For this is the story of Michael and Iana Straw, who jointly and individually neglected their 22 month old baby boy and 11 month old baby girl.  Their explanation: Addicted to video games. (the article is attached below).

It is striking that newspaper story reports that the couple neglected their children.  It does not report that the couple neglected themselves.  Had the story read “The couple was found undernourished and in clothes that they had been wearing for weeks on end”, I might buy claim of addiction.  But if, while playing video games, these two adults managed to take of their own needs while neglecting the needs of their two children, then we what have as an explanation for their neglect of their children is not video addiction but unvarnished child neglect. (more…)

When it comes to Israel, there are in the final analysis essentially two lines of thought: (a) The Israelis are right in just about all they do when it comes defending their state.  (b) The Israelis are wrong in just about all they do when it comes to defending their state.  For those who hold (b), the view seems to be that it is Palestinians who have the honor of being right in just about all they do in defending themselves against the injustices of Israel.  It would seem that some version of (a) applies to Alan Dershowitz and that some version of (b) applies to Norman Finkelstein.

My own view is strikingly simple, perhaps even Solomonic: surely neither Dershowitz or Finkelstein is right.  Jews are not saints.  Palestinians are not saints.  If there is any claim about mortals that is incontrovertibly true, the claim that I have just made about Jews and Palestinians is precisely such a claim.  So I am weary of anyone who talks about either Palestinians or Jews as if they were saints.

Accordingly, the fact that Dershowitz, a quite capable mind cannot see anything of substance, even if requires considerable reformulation, in what Finkelstein says, tells me that his stance is more ideologically driven that not.  Likewise, the fact that Finkelstein, also a quite capable mind cannot see anything of substance, even if requires considerable reformulation, in what Finkelstein says, tells me that his stance is more ideologically driven that not.

In a like manner, I maintain that those who blindly stand by one author-scholar or the other is also more driven by ideology than not.

What I have just said should be not be confused with a different claim, namely that the weight of evidence equally favors the views of each author-scholar.  I assume that one side is more likely to be right than not, though I shall not make any attempt in this essay to make that case—as that is not the point of this entry.

I mean to make a quite different point and criticism of both, namely that something akin to egomania seems to have infected them both.  Each would seem to be more interested in denouncing the other than seeing anything worthwhile in what the other says.

It is next to impossible that Dershowitz has not said anything about Israel that merits consideration on the part of Finkelstein.  Similarly, it is next to impossible that Finkelstein has not said anything about Palestinians that merits consideration on the part of Dershowtiz.  But if anything it clear, it is clear that neither of them is interested in making that small gesture of goodwill.

Let me turn now to the Holocaust.  Now, even truth typically needs to be presented in the right way if there is to be any chance that those being criticized will be receptive to it.  That is, it is perfectly possible to tell the truth in an offensive way.  Contrast “Your tie needs adjusting” with “Your appearance sucks”.

Now, as a logical point the following is true: it is no more impossible for Jews to use the Holocaust in unsavory ways than it is for blacks to use American Slavery (and racism) in unsavory ways.  I know a great many Jews who think that this is unquestionably the case with blacks.  For many people, Jews and non-Jews alike: Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson are both quintessential examples of black folks doing just that.  One the one hand, from this truth in real-time about some blacks with respect to American Slavery, it does not follow at all that any Jew has in fact done the same with respect to the Holocaust.  On the other, given the modest assumption that Jews do not have a greater claim to sainthood than blacks, it is simply wrong to bristle at the very idea that a Jew might have faltered in this way as if the assertion were being made about Moses himself.

Finklestein gives the impression, perhaps unwittingly, that the only things that Jews are interested in when it comes to the Holocaust is extorting money.  Dershowtiz’s response gives the impression, perhaps unwittingly, that when it comes to the Holocaust Jews can do no wrong.  Both positions are absolutely untenable.

The reader will notice that I have been able to criticize both authors simply by being completely even handed in the application of something that goes by the name of commonsense.

It intrigues me enormously that on the issue of Israel and the Holocaust, Dershowitz and Finkelstein seem to go after one another as if nothing else in the world were going on.  Below, I shall give an example that that applies to each of them.

In his book The Holocaust Industry, Finkelstein criticizes Elie Wiesel for his high lecture fees.  While I am not privy to what sorts of fees Wiesel can command, I do know that all sorts of people are paid quite high fees for their lectures.  Former President Clinton has made millions of dollars lecturing for, in some cases, righteous and just causes.  So, it is not at all obvious to me why Wiesel should have to accept less just because he is talking about the Holocaust.  I know two blacks who command substantial fees when talking about the black experience: Cornel West and Henry Louis Gates.  Perhaps all are at fault here.  But for Finkelstein to single out Wiesel, while ignoring the common practice, is simply wrong.

Turning to a different example: One of the painful things about many charity organizations is that typically only a small percentage of the money donated actually seems to go towards the goal in question.  A large portion of the donated money goes towards paying the 6-figure salaries of the CEOs.  This is disheartening, in fact.  Presumably, Dershowitz knows this.  So why on earth would he, or anyone else, expect that organizations pertaining to the Holocaust would be the exception to the rule.  It is downright disingenuous to carry on as if when it comes to the Holocaust such a thing never happens or that it merits special justification.

That both authors are fighting so furiously against one another all the while ignoring the reality of practices that are constantly going on around them tells me that neither is really much concerned with truth here, but with exercising power and domination over the other.  To this end, both have been rather oblivious to the harm that they, as Jewish icons, are doing, both to one another and in terms of modeling woefully inappropriate behavior to Jews and non-Jews alike.  Recall the Los Angeles riots where in the name of moral outrage, blacks did enormous damage to one another’s property.  Blacks are not perfect.  Jews are not perfect.  I think that I am on solid ground in that assertion.

The real pity is not so much that neither group of individuals is perfect, since that has always been the case.  No, the real pity is that two very gifted individuals, who have a lot to offer, albeit in quite different ways, have essentially become committed to being vicious towards one another.  And this they have done in the name of doing good.  Most poignantly, history shows that evil often takes this very form.

To Dershowitz and Finkelstein, I say to each, without hesitation and standing on very solid moral ground: Je vous accuse.

No one in antiquity could possibly have grasped the anonymity that is a defining feature of modernity.  In antiquity, the utter anonymity of modernity was possible only if one lived apart from others as a hermit.  And, if truth be told, the anonymity of a hermit is quite like the anonymity of modernity.  In antiquity, the very idea of two psychological healthy people living next door to one another for years on end all the while knowing next to nothing about one another would have been all but conceptually incoherent.  And, of course, there is the extraordinary anonymity afforded to internet users with virtual rooms and social environments (chat rooms, message boards, and the like).

This is interesting because it means that however the great moral thinkers conceived of responsibility they simply did not think of it from the standpoint of being an entirely anonymous person.

If nothing else anonymity shifts lowers the bar of temptation.  There are lots of things that people never gave any thought to doing, even a few centuries ago, if only because it was very difficult to do those things without it becoming known that one did them.  People have never been perfect, but the community of yesteryear in which people lived provided a form of moral suasion—a very high barrier to temptation, if you will—that no longer exists.  This the community of yesteryear did if only because no one wanted to be known for having done that sort of thing.

In a word, there was the issue of shame that came with being known for having violated the widely held standards of the community.  This applies even to situations that we do not normally countenance as a moral wrong.

When communities thrived, then parents showed up at meetings for the publicly scheduled meetings between parents and teachers because, among other things, no one wanted to be known as the parent who was not concerned enough to show up.  No one wanted the shame that not showing up occasioned. (more…)

There is a fundamental difference between bitterness and righteous indignation, although as with a great many subtle distinctions it is possible for an individual to be mistaken about which sentiment is actually operating in her or his life.  Thus, a person might think that he displaying only righteous indignation when in point of fact he is displaying pure bitterness.  It is, I suppose, possible for person to think that she is displaying bitterness when in reality she is displaying none other than righteous indignation, though this latter scenario seems far more rare.

For what it is worth, these remarks are inspired by a query from a former student regarding some observations about my personal experiences as a professor.  I shall, by the way, use Al Gore to illustrate what it is like not to be bitter.

Whether or not bitterness can ever be justified, there are two things to be said.  One is that it certainly can be understandable why a person is bitter.  The other is that bitterness tends towards self-destructive behavior. (more…)

Insofar as I have a motto, it is this: I should much rather that others be committed to respecting me for the excellences that I exhibit than that their self-identity should turn upon doing things for me.  It is this simple precept that has made me—a black—a conservative among white liberals in the academy.  It is said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions.  Whoever coined that adage must surely have grasped at a most profound level that good intentions can suck the very life out of a person.

Of course, good intentions are very important.  We all want to be the object of them.  Good intentions become a problem, however, when their importance has more to do with underwriting the agent’s conception of himself or herself as a wonderful human being than with actually helping the person in need.  In the latter case, we have what I shall refer to as conceited good intentions.  (more…)